indistinguishable they should have identical hash values. A
We augment the decoder to localize tampering in an image indstnguishab h soldi have identicalnhashves a already deemed to be inauthentic. The localization decoder common approach of media hashing is extracting the fearequires only incremental localization data beyond the authenti-tures which have perceptual importance and should survive cation data since we use rate-adaptive distributed source codes. compression. The authentication data are generated by comBoth decoders perform joint bitplane decoding, rather than pressing the features or generating their hash values. The user conditional bitplane decoding. Our results demonstrate that precss res or the eir hsvaes. Th ueri tampered image blocks can be identified with high probability checks the authentcity of the received content by comparing using authentication plus localization data of only a few hundred the features or their hash values to the authentication data. bytes for a 512x512 image.
We review our image authentication system based on distributed source coding [1] [1] and tampering localization of this paper. We first review coding to image authentication to distinguish the diversity of the authentication system. We denote the source image as legitimate encodings from malicious manipulation.
x. The user receives the image-to-be-authenticated y as the Past approaches fall into two groups: watermarks and media output of a two-state lossy channel that models legitimate and hashes. A "fragile" watermark can be embedded into the host illegitimate modifications. The left-hand side of Fig. 1 shows signal waveform without perceptual distortion [2] [3] . Users that the authentication data consist of a Slepian-Wolf encoded can confirm the authenticity by extracting the watermark from lossy version of x and a digital signature of that version. The the received content. The system design should ensure that the authentication decoder, in the right-hand side of Fig. 1 , knows watermark survives lossy compression, but that it "breaks" as a the statistics of the worst permissible legitimate channel and result of a malicious manipulation. Unfortunately, watermark-can correctly decode the authentication data only with the help ing authentication is not backward compatible with previously of an authentic image y as side information. encoded contents; unmarked contents cannot be authenticated
We model the image-to-be-authenticated y by way of the later. Embedded watermarks might also increase the bit-rate space-varying two-state lossy channel in Fig. 2 how statistically similar the image-to-be-authenticated must In our system, the authentication data are generated by a be to the original to be declared authentic. If the conditional server upon request. Each response uses a different random entropy H (XIY) exceeds the bit-rate R in bits per pixels, X seed Ks, which is provided to the decoder as part of the can no longer be decoded coffectly [8] . Therefore, the rate of authentication data. This prevents an attack which simply S(X) should be chosen to distinguish between the different confines the tampering to the nullspace of the projection. joint transmitted bitplanes I derWol enablestrrat aivity components S(X) of these rates (in bits per pixel of the for all transmlttednticatIn/oalizto em,bwe usea joit original image x) for "Lena" with X quantized to 3 bitplanes. for t v l h c n a tAll five text banners are placed for malicious tampering, bitplane coding for the authentication system as well.
because greater tampering makes 'disauthentication' easier and C. Localization Decoder localization more difficult. The placement is random for 100
The localization decoder applies the sum-product algo-trials, leading to tampering of 12% to 17% of the nonoverrithm [12] on the factor graph in Fig. 4 to estimate each chan-lapping 16x16 blocks of the original image x. To localize nel state likelihood P(Si = 1). Decoding is initialized with tampering in JPEG2000 or JPEG reconstructions above 30dB, the syndrome nodes values S(X) and the side information Y. Fig. 5 indicates that the required authentication plus localizaIn terms of the factor graph, the joint probability of the tion rate is roughly 2.5 times the required authentication rate. bits of the image projection X and the channel states given The incremental localization rate (the gap between the rates) the syndrome values and the side information can be factored discovers not only the location of the tampering but also the as follows. The factor at each syndrome node is an indicator magnitude of the tampering.
function of the satisfaction of that syndrome constraint. The
Next we investigate the worst-case authentication plus localfactor connected to each state node f '(Si) = P(Si). The ization rate necessary for localizing tampering in JPEG2000 factor f '(Xi, Si) = P(Xi Yi; Si). When Si = 0, fb(Xi, 0) or JPEG reconstructions above 30dB. We randomly place one is proportional to the integral of a Gaussian distribution with to five text banners over 2000 trials and run the localization mean Yi and a fixed variance o-over the quantization interval decoder with decision threshold oa = 0.5. Fig. 6 is a scatter plot of Xi. When ST = 1, fi(Xi, 1) is uniform.
of authentication plus localization rates versus percentage of The iterations of belief propagation terminate when the hard affected blocks, for "Peppers" with the 32x32 image projection decisions on bits of X satisfy the constraint imposed by the X quantized to 3 bitplanes. The scatter plots for the other syndrome S(X). Finally 
